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ABSTRACT
The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether there is relationship
between family ownership and controls with discretionary accruals in Malaysia.
This study employed a sample of 478 listed firm's observation of Malaysian listed
companies in the period of year 2012. The samples consist of275 family firms and
203 non family firms. First, the study examines the association between
discretionary accruals with family ownership. The result suggest that discretionary
accruals has association with the family ownership which indicates that high
percentage of the firm's share hold by families will result in low accounting
discretion being reported (Machunga and Teitel, 2009). Second, this study
examines the association between discretionary accruals with family controls.
Surprisingly, the result suggests that discretionary accrual has association with the
family controls. This indicates that high percentage of family members being
appointed and holds position in the board result in high accounting discretion. This
study also found that firm size, leverage, board size, directors independence,
return on equity, CEO duality, BIG 4 auditors and industry influence discretionary
accruals occurrence in family firms specifically in Malaysian environment.
Keywords: Discretionary accruals, family ownership, family control, firm size,
leverage, board size, director's independence, return on equity, CEO duality, BIG
4 auditors, industry.
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